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Abstract   Chile has not yet ratified the U.N. 1995 Agreement on straddling/
highly migratory fish stocks. This paper discusses key economic issues at stake
from the viewpoint of a coastal state with important stakes in a straddling stock.
The Chilean jack mackerel stock, one of Chile’s most important fish resources, is
in this category. This stock is currently caught on adjacent high-seas only by a
Chilean-flag fleet, and currently there is no evidence of imminent competition
from distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). We argue that ratification of the
Agreement could imply negative effects on: (i) coastal states’ sovereignty upon man-
agement measures within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and (ii) national
fishing companies’ competitiveness. Despite this, the net cost/benefit balance
depends on how binding the threat of DWFNs’ fishing competition is expected to
be. If the Agreement does go into force, coastal states with important stakes in
straddling fish stocks will feel increased pressure to ratify as well. For the case
of states that become parties to the Agreement, we discuss pending obstacles for
achieving effective fishery management in the adjacent high-seas. We speculate
about possible solutions to the ‘New Member’ and ‘Interloper’ problems. Re-
garding the former, enforceable closed access would seem to be legally feasible
under the Agreement. In terms of effective enforcement against fishing by illegal
interlopers, innovation in enforcement tools would be needed. In some cases, the
latter may require further adjustments to the Law of the Sea Convention.
Key words   Chilean jack mackerel, high-seas fishing, Law of the Sea Conven-
tion, regional fisheries management organizations, straddling stocks.
Introduction
Chile is among the nations that currently have not ratified the United Nations 1995
Agreement on the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory
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fish stocks (hereafter the Agreement). Chile, however, was among the first countries
to seek a revision of the Law of the Sea Convention (hereafter UNCLOS), regarding
the ruling of high-seas fishing operations (U.N. 1982). Chile’s initial proposal was
that, in the absence of enforceable new international norms concerning high-seas fishing
of straddling stocks, enforcement of coastal states’ conservation/management mea-
sures should be extended to the area compromising the adjacent high-seas. By con-
trast, the Agreement implies that control over the administration of, and fishing ac-
cess to, straddling and/or highly migratory stocks have to be negotiated among the
states with fishing interests in a given high-seas fishery, including coastal states as
well as distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). This paper discusses key economic
issues at stake in the decision of whether or not to ratify the Agreement for a coastal
state like Chile, where one of its most important fish resources (the Chilean jack
mackerel stock) performs straddling seasonal migration to the adjacent high-seas.
This paper does not attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the different
controversies related to high-seas fishing (legal, biological, environmental, geo-po-
litical, and economic issues). We focus on the economic tradeoffs in key fishing op-
tions at stake in the case of a coastal state that exploits a straddling stock in adjacent
high-seas waters.1 We do not discuss possible geo-political implications, such as the
‘Mar Presencial’ concept (Martinez-Busch 1996; Joyner and De Cola 1993;
Gilliland-Dalton 1993). Similarly, although we comment on some key controversies
of interpretation about various clauses in the Agreement, we stop far from undertak-
ing a thorough analysis of evolving legal concepts in the International Law of the
Sea (see Balton 1999; Freestone and Makuch 1998; Tahindro 1997).
The fishery management of straddling stocks, with transboundary (in/out) mi-
gration between coastal states’ EEZ and high-seas waters, is a complex problem—
not only because it involves difficult scientific and technical issues (adequate
knowledge about migratory patterns, biological consequences, and effective en-
forcement of high-seas fishing operations), but also because it implies the need to
address potentially disruptive distributive issues. There exists underlying potential
conflict between coastal states’ desire to extend their jurisdiction to adjacent high-
seas (beyond their current EEZs), and DWFNs’ desire to harvest valuable fish stocks
which are found in adjacent high-seas.
There are no unambiguous legal rules to follow when deciding who should rule
over fishing access and management of straddling stocks while they are in high-seas
waters. Similar to the evolution of other property right structures, the evolution of
legal concepts regarding the exploitation of living resources in high-seas waters is
conditioned by these resources’ evolving scarcity and the bargaining strength of the
claimants to their use. In the case of living resources in high-seas areas, legal evolu-
tion is still far from approaching a stationary state.
Since the replacement of the Holy Roman Empire (European Middle Ages) by a
system of independent sovereign states having definite boundaries in the XVI cen-
tury, it has been generally accepted that coastal states enjoy some rights to regulate,
in their own interests, activities in the seas adjoining their coasts. Which rights, and
over which sea areas, are matters that have been subject to controversy and evolu-
tion since then.
To illustrate, consider the legal evolution that has steadily occurred regarding
the recognition of coastal states’ sovereignty over their territorial seas. In the XVI
and XVII c., early practice and doctrine used vague criteria such as the ‘limits of
1 In recent years, some vessels operating under Chilean flag have started fishing on high-seas waters
which are not adjacent to the Chilean EEZ; e.g., in the Southern Ocean near the South Georgia Islands,
as well as near the Kerquelen and Prince Edward Islands—in both cases fishing toothfish. Though these
vessels are owned by Chile-based companies, the corporate control mostly belongs to Spanish capital.Thalassorama 247
visibility’ to determine the extent of the waters over which control was claimed.
Later, authors proposed the so-called ‘Cannonshot’ doctrine suggesting that coastal
states’ rights over sea waters be extended to the point at which those waters could be
controlled by shore-based cannons. In contrast, Scandinavian states, at that time,
claimed maritime dominion over fixed distances from the shore along the whole
coastline, regardless of the presence or absence of shore batteries (eventually known
as the ‘four-mile Scandinavian league’; Churchill and Love 1985). These controver-
sies continued throughout the formative period of modern international law in the
XVII c.2 In the late XVIII c., different concepts of territorial waters coalesced into a
compromise that proposed a fixed limit of 3 nautical miles (nm) (e.g., in 1793 the
USA adopted a 3 nm territorial sea for neutrality purposes). Evolution in this direc-
tion eventually led to the current limit of territorial waters at 12 nm (or 22 kms).
The legal recognition of a 200 nm (370 kms) EEZ by UNCLOS can be inter-
preted as part of the evolution described above. The EEZ limit represented signifi-
cant support of coastal states’ fishing interests. Nevertheless, UNCLOS left signifi-
cant fish resources with poorly defined legal status. Straddling and highly migratory
stocks have been in this category since then. As a result, in numerous cases they
have faced increasing fishing pressure leading to overfishing consequences.3
The Agreement proposes a negotiated solution, among the interested nations, to
the issues of control rights upon fishing access and management of straddling and/or
highly migratory stocks. Given currently prevailing international conditions, the option
of a further extension of coastal state’s jurisdiction to adjacent high-seas waters seems
less likely than the option of the Agreement’s entry into force and the implementation of
Regional Fishery Management Organizations (hereafter RFMOs) for dealing with
these stocks. Taking this statement as a given premise and focusing on the case of
the straddling Chilean jack mackerel stock, we discuss key economic issues at stake
in Chile’s decision of whether or not (or perhaps when) to ratify the Agreement.
The paper starts by describing the Chilean jack mackerel stock and its main
fishing grounds. It then discusses the possibility of pursuing entry-deterrent fishing
effort in the adjacent high-seas, against the possible arrival of DWFN fleets. Next, it
analyzes the implications of ratifying the Agreement on coastal states’ control over
port use and their sovereignty over fishery management decisions within their EEZ.
Then it discusses two key problems for achieving effective management institutions
for high-seas fishing of straddling stocks: the ‘New Member’ and ‘Interloper’ issues.
Concluding remarks are offered at the end.
The Chilean Jack Mackerel Stock
Among the Chilean fisheries exploiting straddling and/or highly migratory stocks,
the South-Center jack mackerel fishery is by far the most important.4 Figure 1 repre-
2 e.g., the concept of ‘freedom of the seas’ was proposed by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius as early as
1609, but it only became an accepted principle of international law in the XIX c. This was ideologically con-
nected with other XIX c. freedoms (e.g., laissez-faire in economic affairs). ‘Freedom of the seas’ was vigor-
ously pressed by the great maritime and commercial powers at that time, especially Great Britain.
3 In 1994, straddling stocks represented 14.3% of the world marine catch (including catches within and
outside EEZs), while highly migratory stocks represented 5.4% of the global marine catch (Dr. Peter
Manning, personal communication, WHAT Fisheries Resources Commission; WHAT: World Humanity
Action Trust, London ).
4 Other cases are the Chilean sea bass (Dissostichus eleginoides) industrial fishery in the Chilean Aus-
tral zone (total catch of around 4,000 tons in 1994, mostly for export markets) and the swordfish
(Caldera/Coquimbo) fishery (annual catch of around 3,000 tons in the last three years; again, mainly for
export markets).Peña-Torres, Serra, and  Basch 248
Figure 1.  Spatial Distribution of Jack Mackerel
Stocks in the Southeast PacificThalassorama 249
sents the overall spatial distribution (Area A) of jack mackerel stocks which, follow-
ing a ‘colonization’ process that began in the early 1970s, extend into the South East
Pacific as far as 900 nm off the coasts of Central Chile (along the Subtropical Con-
vergence, around 40ºS, reaching New Zealand and Tasmanian waters) (Serra 1991;
Elizarov et al. 1993).
The so-called Chilean jack mackerel stock, distributed within Chilean waters
and in the adjacent high-seas, reaching in some areas to about 110ºW, is believed to
be a self-sustaining stock (able to reproduce itself; Serra 1991). Evseenko (1987)
suggested the existence of an oceanic stock, beyond 120ºW and along the Subtropi-
cal Convergence reaching to New Zealand and Tasmanian waters, but it is as yet a
pending question whether the oceanic stock is self-sustaining or needs inputs from
the Chilean stock to persist.5
Off Chilean coasts, the jack mackerel is caught with other small pelagic species
(i.e., pilchard, anchovy) in four main fishing grounds: a Northern (NZ) fishery, a
North Center or Coquimbo (NC) fishery, the Talcahuano or South-Center fishery,
and an international fishery in high-seas adjacent to the Chilean EEZ (figure 1). Fig-
ure 2 shows the recent catch history of these fisheries. Since the early 1980s, private
investment boomed in the Talcahuano fishery, initially triggering increased catches,
which resulted later in overcapacity and overfishing (Peña 1997; Serra 1998).6 Since
the early 1990s, the Chilean-owned fleet operating in the Talcahuano fishery ex-
panded its fishing effort beyond the Chilean EEZ, reaching, in recent years, up to
about 300 nm off the Chilean coastline. This evolution resulted in increased invest-
ment in vessels with capacity to reach high-seas areas (vessels with >800m3 of hold
capacity). In 1995, vessels in this category represented 44% of the total fleet’s hold
capacity in the South-Center jack mackerel fishery (table 1).
During the 1970s and 1980s, the increasing abundance of the Chilean jack
mackerel stock was one of the reasons underlying the expansion of Chilean fishing
effort into adjacent high-seas areas. The parental stock expanded until 1989; after-
wards, it began a declining phase as a result of relatively low recruitment (in the late
1980s and early 1990s) and increased catches (figure 3). Another important reason
was the 1992 disappearance of the DWFN fleet that fished jack mackerel in the
high-seas adjacent to Chilean and Peruvian waters.7 In 1990, this DWFN fleet
caught 1.1 million tons of jack mackerel in adjacent high-seas waters in the South
East Pacific, mostly in the adjacent zone off the Central Chile EEZ.
During 1997, a scarcity of adults became evident in the South-Center fishery
(Serra 1998), the result of overfishing and a strong El Niño (from the middle of
5 There are two main competing hypotheses in this debate: a ‘single stock’ (Elisarov et al. 1993) versus
a ‘three stocks’ theory (Storozhuk et al. 1987). Serra (1991) supports the theory of three independent
stocks (Chilean, Oceanic, and Peruvian).
6 De jure closed access regulation has prevailed in this fishery since 1986, though achieving only limited
effectiveness. Since 1993, it has been under ‘full exploitation’ status which opens the possibility of us-
ing total allowable catch (TAC) quotas, among other regulations (Peña 1996, 1997). So far, TACs have
not been used in this fishery. During 1997–98, temporary closed fishing seasons were the dominant
regulation. For 1999, a TAC proposal of 2 million tons has been under debate, subject to the possibility
of free-cost allocated ITQs.
7 This fleet was mainly composed of vessels from Poland, Cuba, and Russia, the latter being dominant.
It fished in this area from 1978 up to 1992; its main fishing grounds were located in high-seas areas in
front of Central Chile. Forty-two Soviet vessels were sighted operating 210 to 250 miles off the Chilean
Coast in 1981, increasing to 73 vessels by 1983, and to 80 one year later. During the late 1980s, it was
composed of about 70 factory midwater trawlers (Crone-Bilger 1990, p. 118). For Russian vessels, the
main products were frozen fish and fish meal. For Polish, it was canned fish. Retreat from this fishery
was an economic consequence of the disintegration of the ex-Soviet Union and the economic collapse
associated with it. While this fleet operated in this region, there was no collaboration between Soviet
Union and Chilean counterparts.Peña-Torres, Serra, and  Basch 250
Figure 2.  Jack Mackerel Landings in the Southeast Pacific Off
the Chilean Coast [NZ = Northern Zone; NC = North Center; Thno =
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Figure 3.  Abundance of the Chilean Jack Mackerel Stock (Covering the
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1997 up to early 1999). As a consequence, this fishery is undergoing a period of cri-
sis. Given that the Chilean jack mackerel stock is currently passing through a deli-
cate ‘fully exploited’ status (i.e., no production surplus left, and significant uncer-
tainty about sustainable catch levels), and that its main spawning area is located in
the adjacent high-seas,8 the possible return of DWFN fleets to this high-seas area is
perceived by the Chilean government and private vested interests as a sensitive sub-
ject.9 At the price and catch levels prevailing in the mid-1990s, the Chilean catch of
jack mackerel generated around US$650m/yr. in exports (Sarquis 1996). The re-
gional employment provided by these fisheries has political importance as well, par-
ticularly in the case of the South-Center fishery.10
Entry-deterrent Fishing Effort in the Adjacent High-seas?
It is an open question whether it would be convenient for Chilean interests to allow
further expansion of national fishing effort into the relevant adjacent high-seas as an
entry-deterrent strategy preventing the potential arrival of DWFN fleets into this
fishery. This is a proposal which might enjoy popular support in Chile; its economic
convenience, however, is far from clear.
Let us suppose that current catch returns provide incentives for Chilean entre-
preneurs to expand their fishing effort in this area, perhaps requiring further invest-
ment in vessels capable of reaching these high-seas waters. Two important issues
should be addressed before regulatory approval is granted for further expansion of
Chilean fishing effort in this area. First, the implications on the stock’s
sustainability. This stock is believed to be in a delicate “fully exploited” status
(Serra 1998); hence, associated risks on the stock’s reproductive capacity should be
explicitly assessed (Peña, Barton, and Fuentes 1999). As long as the sustainable
catch is below the levels caught during the mid-1990s (as it doubtless will be in the
following years), further investment in fishing capacity would simply worsen an al-
ready existing over-capacity problem (especially given the absence of suitable alter-
native fishing grounds).
Second, it may still be argued that current restraints on Chilean fishing effort
would be an unproductive (hence, too costly) policy, as they may simply result in
increased chances for the arrival of DWFN fleets into the adjacent high-seas, with-
out allowing for any secure long-run benefits for Chilean interests. This idea, as
well as the proposal of increased domestic fishing effort as entry-deterrence against
foreign fleets, presumes that higher fishing effort would not only reduce the stock
availability in this fishery, but also the profitability of marginal effort units. In pe-
lagic fisheries, however, marginal harvesting costs are often not very sensitive to
changes in stock size, at least until the stock arrives at dangerously overexploited
levels (Peña and Basch 2000; Basch, Peña, and Dufey 1999; Bjørndal 1989; Csirke
8 The seasonal migration of the Chilean jack mackerel stock consists of migrating from coastal to high-
seas waters to spawn, returning to coastal waters for feeding.
9 Interest in this high-seas fishery has been shown in recent years by Japan and other Asiatic countries;
e.g., China. The Japanese have done research on the Chilean jack mackerel, exploring its abundance and
its use for surimi production. Some opinions in Chile suggest that Russia could have interest to reenter
this fishery, particularly if Chilean ports could be used to transship production.
10 In 1994, the regions involved in the South-Center fisheries area (regions V to IX) accounted for 56%
of the direct and permanent industrial fishing jobs (harvesting and processing sectors) provided by cap-
ture fisheries in Chile (Nilo and Palta 1997). Adding industrial, artisanal, and aquaculture fisheries, perma-
nent and direct fishing employment would represent around 100,000 jobs in Chile. The addition of tempo-
rary/transient related jobs could increase the latter figure to around 500,000 (Bernal and Aliaga, 1999).Thalassorama 253
11 Questioning the preeminence of national law, relative to international law, concerning control of port
use has already been attempted; e.g., the EU’s allegation against Canada’s 1989 ruling which closed ac-
cess to Canadian ports to EU’s fleets, based on Article V of the ‘Marrakech Agreement’ (which estab-
lished the World Trade Organization (WTO) as replacement to GATT). Article V establishes the obliga-
tion of WTO member states to ensure “freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting
party… for traffic in transit to and from the territory of other contracting party.” However, the applica-
tion of this broad rule should not be directly valid for fishing vessels and their catch, as the latter does
not necessarily represent an ‘international trade’ operation (on which article V is applicable to) between
the coastal state and a DWFN fleet. The validity of this argument is strengthened when the coastal
state’s restrictions over port use are based on national legislation which has as its primary focus the en-
forcement of conservation measures concerning stocks harvested by that coastal state’s vessels within its
EEZ (Article XX(g) of the GATT Agreement exempts from GATT rules—subject to conditions of no ar-
bitrary discrimination and no barriers to trade—policy measures relating to the conservation of exhaust-
ible natural resources). In this case, Article 297(3a) of UNCLOS should also apply (it exempts any
coastal state from accepting the submission to settlement of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights
with respect to the living resources in its EEZ).
1988). As a result, it is not clear that higher domestic fishing effort would be an ef-
fective entry-deterrent strategy against the arrival of DWFNs.
If DWFN fleets have been out of this fishery, it is probably due to the costs of
moving these fleets into these fishing grounds, and to the costs of speedy transporta-
tion of the processed catch back to demand markets. The latter costs are probably
affected by Chilean rulings on whether to allow or deny access to Chilean ports for
landing or transshipment of fish caught by DWFNs in the adjacent high-seas.
The Agreement and Coastal States’ Control over Port Use
Under UNCLOS, the lawful regulation of port use by any type of vessel is a matter
which remains, in principle, fully dependent on the port state’s national law;11 while
controversies of interpretation about the port state’s rights in this area are subject to
voluntary solution procedures (Montt, Iruarrizaga and Co. 1996). Would ratification
of the Agreement change the port state’s rights in this area?
We see two sets of issues regarding the answer to this question. In this section,
we analyze issues related to landing or transshipment controls based on the enforce-
ment of conservation or/and management (hereafter C/M) measures defined by the
port state for straddling stocks which can be caught within its EEZ. We will refer to
the second set of issues in the next section.
Article 23(3) in the Agreement recognizes the port state’s right to “prohibit
landings and  transshipments where it has been established that the catch has been
taken in a manner which undermines the effectiveness of subregional, regional, or
global C/M measures on the high-seas” [italics is ours]. The latter includes measures
adopted by a RFMO, which is the institutional setting proposed by the Agreement as
a negotiated solution (among the coastal state and other interested fishing nations)
for the management of straddling stocks in high-seas areas.
Notice that Article 23(3) makes no mention of the port state’s right to prohibit
landings and transshipments (of fish caught in the high-seas) when the catch under-
mines the effectiveness of C/M measures taken within the EEZ. However, Article 23(4)
explicitly recognizes the exercise of coastal states’ sovereignty over ports in their territo-
ries, “in accordance with international law.” Therefore, as long as landing/transshipment
controls cannot be questioned as discriminatory measures or unlawful barriers to
trade, there seems to exist no impediment here for coastal state’s sovereign exercise
of port controls, if the latter are aimed at enforcing the effectiveness of C/M mea-
sures for straddling stocks which can be caught within the coastal state’s EEZ.Peña-Torres, Serra, and  Basch 254
Nonetheless, Montt, Iruarrizaga and Co. (1996) argued that ratification of
the Agreement would lead to accepting compulsory solution procedures if con-
troversies of interpretation over the coastal state’s rights in this area emerged.12
In this case, the coastal state’s rights over port use could become conditioned
by International Law, as controversies of interpretation may be ultimately
settled by an International Tribunal. However, for port state’s measures, as
those defined in this section, we believe this conclusion is invalid. Indeed, Ar-
ticle 32 of the Agreement extends to states which are party to the Agreement,
the limitations on the applicability of procedures for the settlement of disputes,
specified in Article 297 of UNCLOS. In particular, Article 297(3) exempts any
coastal state from the obligation to accept submissions to settlement of “any
dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in the
EEZ or their exercise, including its discretionary powers for determining the al-
lowable catch, its harvesting capacity....and the terms and conditions estab-
lished in its conservation and management laws and regulations.”13 Therefore,
from the perspective of landing or transshipment controls, which are based on
enforcing C/M measures for straddling stocks caught within the EEZ, and
which are in accordance with international law, we conclude that ratification of
the Agreement would imply no change with respect to the coastal state’s rights
over port use under UNCLOS and current customary international law.
Coastal States’ Sovereignty over Fishery Management Decisions
(Including Port Use) within their EEZ
Here we discuss ‘the other side of the coin’ to the question on port state’s con-
trol rights. We now argue that ratification of the Agreement could imply, under
some conditions, subordination of coastal state’s sovereign rights, regarding the
management of a straddling stock caught within its EEZ, to C/M measures
agreed by a RFMO for high-seas fishing of that stock.14 Potential conflicts of
preeminence between the two key legal principles involved (coastal state’s sov-
ereign rights upon C/M measures within its EEZ, and RFMO’s control rights
over C/M measures for high-seas fishing of a straddling stock) belong to un-
charted legal areas that emerge in the case of ratifying the Agreement.
Before discussing implications, let us set the basis of our claim: Article 3
states that Articles 6 and 7 (of the Agreement) not only apply to the C/M of
straddling stocks and highly migratory stocks on the high-seas, but also to C/M
measures to such stocks while in waters under national jurisdiction (subject to
12 Article 27 of the Agreement establishes the “States’ obligation to settle their disputes by peaceful
means” (the latter are described in Articles 28-30). When referring to the settlement of disputes between
states, UNCLOS uses  less mandatory wording, “States Parties shall seek a solution (by peaceful
means)…” (UNCLOS, Article 279).
13 The Chilean Fisheries Law (L.D. 430, 1991), in its Article 165(3) rules, “The Ministry [of Economics]
can prohibit the landing, supplying and any other services provided to vessels at Chilean ports and
within the Chilean EEZ, when there exists founded presumption that these vessels’ fishing activities af-
fect stocks harvested by Chilean vessels within the EEZ.”
14  Tahindro (1997) seems to suggest otherwise. He argues that, when considering the clauses in
UNCLOS and the Agreement as a whole… “It may be inferred… that the coastal states’ interests might
take priority over those of high-seas fishing states in circumstances where they would be unable to agree
on compatible measures for the C/M of straddling stocks...” (p.18). This is Tahindro’s personal interpre-
tation, as it is the nature of our claim here.Thalassorama 255
the different legal regimes that apply within areas under national jurisdic-
tion...). [italics ours]. Let us focus on Article 7.15
Article 7 refers to cooperation requirements for coastal states and DWFNs vis-
à-vis the implementation of C/M methodologies (for straddling stocks) within and
beyond the areas of national jurisdiction. Article 7 leaves, we believe, space for am-
biguity and disputes of interpretation regarding preeminence between potentially
conflicting legal principles. On one hand, Articles 7(1) and 7(2a) recognize the
coastal state’s sovereign rights upon C/M measures for fish caught within its EEZ.16
On the other, both Articles set potentially conflicting “duties of cooperation” for the rel-
evant coastal state and DWFNs. Article 7(1a) states that the relevant coastal state and
DWFNs “shall seek...to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of the
[straddling] stock in the adjacent high-seas” [italics is ours] (the wording here does
not differ qualitatively from  the ‘duty’ established in Article 63(2) of UNCLOS).
While Article 7(2) starts by stating, “C/M measures established for the high-seas
and those adopted for the EEZ shall be compatible... To this end, coastal states and
other states fishing in the high-seas have a duty to cooperate...” [italics is ours]
(UNCLOS, Article 64(1), states the less mandatory “[the relevant coastal states and
DWFNs] shall cooperate to ensuring conservation...within and beyond the EEZ.”).
What is meant by “compatible” C/M measures? What happens if the coastal
state is questioned by a DWFN as not fulfilling its “duty to cooperate?” Given that
one of the key underlying issues at stake here is who gets what rights to fish the
straddling stock on adjacent high-seas waters, and that the states involved may have
different fishing objectives as well as assign different valuations to the right to ex-
ploit that stock, controversies of interpretation seem likely. We find no rulings in the
Agreement, in UNCLOS, or in the combination of both, which could unambiguously
settle disputes in this respect.
Consider an illustration of this point. On one hand, Article 7(2e) in the Agree-
ment states that “[as part of the duty to cooperate for the purpose of achieving com-
patible measures in respect of straddling stocks, the relevant party states] shall take into
account the respective dependence of the coastal states and the other states fishing in the
high-seas on the stocks concerned.” On the other, suppose that in the opinion of a
DWFN whose vessels fish on the high-seas adjacent to a coastal state’s EEZ, an existing
or proposed C/M measure (set or suggested by the coastal state) would cause damage to
its commercial fishing interests and to those of its communities that depend on fishing.
Could this position be used as an argument against the adoption of rigorous manage-
ment measures by the coastal state? Freestone and Makuch (1998) argue that a legal
case could be made here for sustaining a controversy of interpretation.
Though it is true that Article 32 of the Agreement offers a qualified weaving
through the “states’ obligation to settle the disputes..” (Article 27), thereby diluting the
chances of facing a compulsory solution procedure, the settlement between potentially
conflicting legal principles in these disputes remains an uncharted legal territory.
15 Article 6 refers to application of the Precautionary Principle (‘the absence of adequate scientific in-
formation shall not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take C/M measures...’) to straddling/
highly migratory stocks. It includes conditions for parties to the Agreement such as, “States shall share
the best scientific information available…,” “States shall determine stock-specific reference points…
and shall take measures to ensure that, when reference points are approached, they will not be ex-
ceeded.” Settlement of the implications of exceeding ‘reference points’ is left to the states acting
through a relevant RFMO.
16 Article 7(1) starts by stating, “Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal states for the pur-
pose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the living marine resources within areas un-
der national jurisdiction as provided for in UNCLOS,…”; while Article 7(2a) states that, “[as part of the
duty to cooperate], C/M measures taken on the high-seas shall not undermine the effectiveness of mea-
sures taken by coastal states within areas of national jurisdiction.”Peña-Torres, Serra, and  Basch 256
In addition to conflicts of preeminence between legal principles and the rights
of the states involved, there are two other important implications.  First, conflicts in
this area would obviously involve distributive disputes between coastal states and
DWFNs. Coastal states would like to gain full control over fishing rights for strad-
dling stocks in their adjacent high-seas, but the Agreement goes for a negotiated so-
lution to this issue.17 Unless ratification of the Agreement were a complete failure
(which seems unlikely),18 it is improbable, for the time being, that coastal states’
distributive aims in this area could gain enough support to successfully challenge
prevailing International Law on the matters affected. Moreover, we argue later that,
in case the Agreement does enter into force for the parties to it, coastal states with
important stakes in straddling fish stocks will feel pressure to ratify it as well, par-
ticularly when fishing competition from DWFN fleets in the adjacent high-seas rep-
resents a binding threat.
Second, suppose a coastal state and a DWFN have both ratified the Agreement
and set a RFMO for managing a commonly exploited straddling stock in adjacent
high-seas waters. Assume the DWFN fleet complies satisfactorily with all the C/M
measures established by that RFMO for high-seas fishing. Suppose now the DWFN
fleet requests access to coastal states’ ports for landing or transshipping its catch
from the adjacent high-seas. Could the coastal state deny or limit access to its ports?
Unless a sound case could be made against that DWFN fleet’s high-seas fishing,
based on negative effects on the effectiveness of the C/M measures for EEZ fishing of
the same stock (a claim which may be difficult to substantiate if the DWFN fleet has
been complying with the C/M measures negotiated within the RFMO), the denial of ac-
cess to coastal states’ ports would tend to appear unlawful under international law. In
this case, the competitiveness of coastal states’ fishing companies could be at stake.
The conclusions suggested in this section do not necessarily imply that ratifica-
tion of the Agreement is a bad decision for a coastal state with important stakes in
the exploitation of straddling stocks. One of the key conditionings of the convenience of
whether or not to ratify the Agreement (or perhaps of the optimal timing for ratification,
as modeled in Kaitala and Lindroos 1999) is how damaging the threat of fishing
competition from DWFN fleets in the adjacent high-seas is expected to be.
Access to Fish Resources in the Adjacent High-seas:  The ‘New Member’
Problem
Some commentators (e.g., Hayashi 1996) have suggested that the Agreement (par-
ticularly, the combination of Articles 8 and 17) may undermine the concept of free-
dom of fishing on the high-seas, hence implying a departure from the letter of
UNCLOS. We will not qualify this debate here. As numerous stocks caught in high-
seas waters become scarcer, we share the view that, to avoid progression of wasteful
overfishing in the high-seas (facilitated by UNCLOS’s weaknesses in this respect),19
qualified controls on this freedom should be imposed. As Munro (1995) stated,
“stable [i.e., successful] cooperative management regimes for straddling and highly
17 States’ relative bargaining strength on these matters would most likely be conditioned by issues going
beyond ‘fishery considerations.’ States’ relative international standing (e.g., trade issues involved)
should be expected to play a significant role.
18 Up to 10th June 1999, 23 states had ratified the Agreement. In order for the Agreement to enter into
force, the minimum number of ratifying parties is 30 (Article 40).
19 When Balton (1999) refers to the enforcement implications from the application of UNCLOS’ prin-
ciple of exclusive flag-state jurisdiction over vessels on the high-seas, he uses the analogy of “a safe
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migratory stocks will not be possible unless the relevant adjacent high-seas become
high-seas [i.e., full common property] in name only.” Accepting this principle, could
ratification of the Agreement lead to successful enforcement of cooperative manage-
ment for a straddling stock? This section, and the next, discuss this issue.
On one hand, the Agreement (Article 8: para. 3, 4, and 5) does confer, to a given
RFMO, de jure control rights upon access to high-seas fishing of the straddling
stock under the RFMO’s jurisdiction. While Article 8 (para. 3 and 5) establish that states
are obliged to cooperate with the relevant RFMO or to establish one where none exist
[italics is ours], Article 8(4) rules that failure to observe this duty  (i.e., to become a
member or participant in the RFMO, or agree to apply the C/M measures estab-
lished by such RFMO), bars access to the fishery resources to which the measures
established by members or participants of the RFMO concerned apply [italics ours].
On the other hand, Article 8 includes an ambiguous access condition for states
wishing to become members of an already established RFMO.
States having a real interest in the fisheries concerned may become members of
such organization... The terms for participation in such organization shall not pre-
clude such states from membership or participation; nor shall they be applied in a
manner which discriminates against any state or group of states having a real inter-
est in the fisheries concerned (Article 8(3)) [italics ours].
The definition of ‘having a real interest in the fishery’ can involve controversy.
If this were to imply de facto free access to the RFMO, it would bar any possibility
of achieving an effective RFMO, as free-riding would eventually become the domi-
nant strategy (Munro 1999). A possible way out of this would be that RFMOs could
differentiate between allocating ‘participatory rights’ and ‘fishing rights.’ This dif-
ferentiation seems legally possible under the Agreement.20
The allocation of ‘participatory rights’ would serve RFMOs to fulfill their duty
of not precluding any state ‘having a real interest in the fishery’ from participating
in such organizations. The ‘participatory’ right (and the associated duties) would of-
fer the option to obtain ‘high-seas fishing rights’ upon the straddling stock in waters
under the RFMO’s jurisdiction. The conditions for being granted ‘fishing rights’
would be defined, through negotiation, when starting the RFMO. Article 11 of the
Agreement defines basic criteria that could be used to differentiate between the na-
ture and extent of ‘participatory rights’ and ‘fishing rights’.
In order that RFMOs could become effective organizations, the differentiation
proposed should lead to enforceable closed access conditions (in terms of rights to
fish the straddling stock on the relevant high-seas). Could then an effective RFMO
be consistent with allowing new members nondiscriminatory access to ‘fishing rights’
on that high-seas fishery? An efficient solution would be to price access to these fishing
rights; e.g., by balancing the allocation of new members’ fishing rights to a correspond-
ing surrender of fishing rights by one or more of the RFMO’s current members. Further-
more, to increase the chances that the RFMO could effectively manage the straddling
stock; e.g., withstanding unpredictable significant changes in the fishery’s productivity,
the selling of fishing rights (e.g., percentage shares in total allowable catch) should also
allow for tradability and divisibility of fishing shares among RFMO’s current mem-
bers, thereby making possible transfer payments from members with higher mar-
ginal valuation of these fishing rights to members with lower marginal valuation.
Unfortunately, even if the proposals above were implemented, and monitoring/
control efforts led to effective enforcement of the RFMO members’ allocated fishing
20 Personal communication with David Balton, one of the lawyers within the US team that participated
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shares, RFMOs’ management success would still depend upon solving an additional
problem; i.e., the possibility of illegal fishing within high-seas areas under the
RFMO’s jurisdiction, by vessels operating under the flag of a state which, by own
choice, has decided to be a nonmember of that RFMO. Munro (1999) calls this the
‘Interloper’ problem.
The ‘Interloper’ Problem
If the threat of interlopers’ illegal fishing were to be binding, and the involved
RFMO had no effective powers to stop it, then free-riding (e.g., current members
stop being dutiful parties to the RFMO) could easily dominate. RFMO’s manage-
ment efforts would then become ineffective.
Imagine a straddling-stock fishery where interlopers’ illegal high-seas fishing
would be a profitable activity. Under UNCLOS, enforcement of C/M measures on
high-seas fishing falls under flag-state jurisdiction. Evidence has proven, however,
that this approach can involve significant weaknesses (Balton 1999; Munro 1999).
While maintaining the enforcement duties of flag states, as specified in UNCLOS,
the Agreement attempts to strengthen enforcement powers upon high-seas fishing
(for details, see Tahindro 1997; Freestone and Makuch 1998).
Regarding the C/M of straddling stocks, Article 17 of the Agreement states the
principle that nonmember states of a given RFMO are not discharged from the obli-
gation to cooperate with such RFMO. Under this principle, flag states are responsible,
even if they are nonmembers of the affected RFMO, for enforcement as well as institut-
ing proceedings against illegal fishing by interlopers operating under their flag.21
(Settlement of the implications of not fulfilling this flag-state obligation is decided,
in accordance with international law, by the states’ members of the RFMO.)
However, Part VI of the Agreement (particularly, Articles 20–21) makes RFMOs
a vehicle for adopting and implementing inspection schemes upon vessels which are
suspected of unauthorized fishing in waters under the RFMO’s jurisdiction.22 In-
deed, Article 21(1) sets the right, of a state party to both the Agreement and the af-
fected RFMO, to board and inspect (in high-seas areas under the jurisdiction of the
RFMO) any suspected vessel flying the flag of a state party to the Agreement, even
if the relevant flag state is a nonmember of the affected RFMO.
Despite attempts to improve enforcement powers upon high-seas fishing, there
remain two important areas of doubt regarding the chances of achieving effective
enforcement against the threat of interlopers’ illegal fishing. Firstly, it is yet to be
tested whether or not specific enforcement tools, agreed within each RFMO, would
deal satisfactorily with free-riding issues.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Articles 20(6) and 21(1) of the Agree-
ment, which attempt to strengthen enforcement powers upon high-seas fishing,
would only be binding on states parties to the Agreement. In the case of Article 17,
the same can be inferred (see Freestone and Makuch 1998, p.34). Hence, interlopers
may find ‘safe havens’ by flying flags of states which choose to be nonmember of
the affected RFMO as well as nonparties to the Agreement.
In a few cases, among currently existing RFMOs, successful enforcement of
RFMOs’ rulings seems to have occurred. For example, Munro (1999) cites the re-
21 Articles 18–19 describe the flag states’ duties that emerge from the ‘obligation to cooperate’ with RFMOs.
22 For example, under Article 20(6), a given flag state may permit a concerned coastal state to board and
inspect a vessel (operating under the former state’s flag) which is suspected of unauthorized fishing
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cent success (from 1996 to present) of a cooperative (five-state) management
scheme for the (straddling) Norwegian spring-spawning herring stock.23 As ex-
amples of promising enforcement actions taken by existing RFMOs, Balton (1999)
cites the adoption (from 1994 to present) of multilateral trade embargoes, by state
members of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT), against permissive flag (nonmember) states whose vessels are engaged in
damaging fishing activities against ICCAT’s objectives.24 Another recent example is
the implementation (since 1997) by NAFO (North Pacific Anadromous Fish—
salmon to all intents and purposes—Commission) of restrictions on landings of fish
caught by nonmember states in transgression of NAFO’s C/M measures.25 The Com-
mission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources has also adopted
a modified version of NAFO’s enforcement actions and is currently considering the
possibility of complementary measures, such as a catch certification scheme.
It is yet to be seen if maintaining successful enforcement, in the examples
quoted above, will require new enforcement tools or powers. Doubts in a similar di-
rection underlie the future of the Agreement. Successful enforcement of the Agree-
ment, in case it enters into force, might require further modifications to the Interna-
tional Law of the Sea (e.g., to allow for international policing of ‘bad’ fishing actors
throughout an ‘International Fishing Interpol-like’ institution).
Beyond the uncertainties surrounding uncharted legal grounds, opened by the
possibility of the Agreement’s entry into force, and as with many other regulatory
decisions concerning marine fisheries, there are no absolute rules to follow when as-
sessing the likelihood of effective enforcement of potential RFMO’s C/M measures.
The size and nature of the area under RFMO’s jurisdiction, the stock migratory pat-
terns and the available knowledge about them, the number and nature of the parties
involved (e.g., the relative resource valuations and bargaining strengths of RFMO’s
prospective members; the significance of interlopers’ fishing threat), are examples
of features which condition the likelihood of achieving successful fishery manage-
ment.
Concluding Remarks
The Chilean jack mackerel stock is currently caught in adjacent high-seas off
Chile’s EEZ only by a fleet operating under Chilean flag. Though signs of interest in
this fishery have been shown in recent years by some DWFNs (e.g., Japan and Rus-
sia), we are not aware of current evidence signaling imminent competition from
DWFN fleets in this area. This situation explains, to a great extent, Chile’s current
cautious position of ‘wait-and-see’ regarding ratification of the Agreement. In the
meantime, Chile is pursuing preliminary talks with member states of the Permanent
Commission of the South Pacific (Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Chile), in view of
developing common-ground understanding about implications from a possible ratifi-
23 The current scheme involves Norway (the dominant coastal state in this fishery), the Faroe Islands,
Iceland, Russia, and the EU. The cooperative agreements are renewed annually. The year-by-year agree-
ments are accompanied by bilateral agreements between pairs of ‘players,’ allowing exploitation rights
in one another’s waters; e.g., the EU is allowed to take a certain amount of its harvest in Norwegian
waters and vice versa. (Munro 1999, pp. 23–24)
24 After identifying nonmember states whose vessels are engaged in damaging fishing activities, ICCAT
can authorize its members to prohibit the importation of bluefin products from the nonmember States in
question.
25 A caveat: NAFO jurisdiction is upon a relatively compact high-seas area; hence the NAFO joint in-
spection scheme allows for effective monitoring of all relevant fishing activities by members and non-
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cation of the Agreement.
We have argued that the Agreement does involve potentially conflicting legal
principles, implying possible negative effects on coastal states’ sovereignty upon
conservation/management measures within their EEZs and the competitiveness of
domestic fishing companies. This, by itself, does not imply that ratification of the
Agreement would be a bad public decision from a coastal state’s viewpoint. The
cost/benefit balance depends on how binding the disruptive effects from DWFNs’
noncooperative fishing competition are expected to be. How binding this threat
could be depends on, among other things, the prevailing cost differentials between
incumbent coastal state(s) and potential DWFN entrants. We are not aware of stud-
ies on relevant empirical parameters for assessing these issues in the Chilean jack
mackerel high-seas fishery. Contributions in this area would be welcome.
We have also taken the view that, given the international coalitions which pre-
vailed when negotiating the drafting of the Agreement, the option of the
Agreement’s entry into force (i.e., having at least thirty ratifying parties) currently
seems more likely than the possibility of extending coastal states’ fishery-manage-
ment jurisdiction to relevant high-seas waters. Moreover, if the Agreement does go
into force, then coastal states with important stakes in straddling fish stocks will feel
increased pressure to ratify as well (with the optimal timing for ratification depend-
ing on how binding the disruptive effects from DWFNs’ fishing competition are per-
ceived to be in each case). Otherwise, nonratifying states will run the risk of being
preempted by states which are parties to the Agreement, as  first claimants to ‘hav-
ing real interest’ in a given high-seas fishery. Nonratifying states could thus endan-
ger their initial bargaining position, in case the definition of access rules and fishing
restrictions for a given high-seas fishery had to be negotiated with other states.
Beyond particular management details in specific high-seas fisheries, ratifica-
tion of the Agreement would still leave significant questions unanswered. Among
them, how to deal with the so-called ‘New Member’ and ‘Interloper’ problems. Re-
garding the former, the only way of achieving effective management would be if
RFMOs were able to enforce closed access conditions. Under the Agreement, this
could be achieved if RFMOs differentiated between allocating ‘participatory’ versus
‘fishing’ rights to new members. The former right would imply the option to get the
latter, provided new members agreed to comply with the corresponding duties de-
fined by the RFMO. ‘Participatory’ rights would be allocated to all states having a
‘real interest’ in the corresponding high-seas fishery, whereas ‘fishing’ rights could
be subject to priced access. Tradability and divisibility of fishing rights, among cur-
rent as well as prospective members of the RFMO, would enhance the economic ef-
ficiency embodied in such a management system, while at the same time making it
more resilient to unpredictable changes in fishery productivity. Both features—
priced access and tradable fishing rights—would seem to be legally feasible under
the combined framework of the Agreement and the Law of the Sea Convention.
However, enhanced value creation from the proposals above could still face for-
midable obstacles if the ‘Interloper’ problem represented a binding constraint. It re-
mains to be tested, at specific RFMOs, whether or not enforcement powers available
under the Agreement could deal satisfactorily with interlopers’ illegal fishing. Under
the Agreement, current weaknesses in the prevailing principle of flag-state enforce-
ment for high-seas fishing remain basically unchanged. Hence, effective enforce-
ment would require RFMOs to use new enforcement tools (e.g., trade sanctions,
compliance catch labeling). In some cases, international agreement on further ad-
justments to the Law of the Sea Convention might be needed (e.g., for setting an
‘International Fishing Interpol-like’ institution). For the moment, however, discus-Thalassorama 261
sion of these issues is still in the realm of speculation.
Finally, looking ahead, it seems likely that fishing effort will continue expand-
ing to new fishing grounds, as profitability of current ones falls. It seems equally
likely that high-seas areas in the South-East Pacific, as well as in the Antarctic
Ocean, could sustain profitable development of new high-seas fisheries, provided
successful advances in fishing technology and/or development of new fishing prod-
ucts (e.g., human-edible, krill-based products) were achieved. To make this a reality
requires exploratory fishing effort, as well as further technological/scientific master-
ing. Despite that the overall challenge probably exceeds Chile’s exclusive reach,
Chile and other countries alike should develop strategies for becoming contributors
in the efforts needed.
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